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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14635

INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a
corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELIANT
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff, Union
Pacific Railroad Company, to enforce an indemnity provision
in its lease agreement with the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was heard by the court based upon stipulated facts, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge,
presiding.

The court found the legal issues in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant.

Judgment was entered

accordingly.· From said conclusions of law and judgment, this
appeal is taken.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case were undisputed and submitted
to the court by stipulation of the parties (R 88).

The stip-

ulation recites as follows:
1.

Union Pacific Railroad Company is now, and has

been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, operating
a railroad system in the State of Utah and in surrounding
states.
2.

Intermountain Farmers Association is now, and

has been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
3.

On February 6, 1964, plaintiff and its lessor,

Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, entered into a
written agreement with defendant (Hereinafter referred to as
"Subject Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto,
marked Exhibit "A", and by this reference made a part hereof,
that provides in general for the leasing of certain property
(Hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises"), at Draper,
Salt Lake County, Utah, for a warehouse, grainery, cold storage, platform, and driveway site.
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4.

Pursuant to an extension rider dated October 9,

1968, a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B",
and by this reference made a part hereof, and an addendum,
dated December 31, 1970, a copy of which is attached hereto,
marked Exhibit "C", and by this reference made a part hereof,
the terms and conditions of the Subject Agreement were in
full force and effect to and including November 30, 1973.
S.

At approximately 7:00 o'clock p.m., on October

31, 1972, at a time when the Subject Agreement was in full
force and effect, and while plaintiff's employees were performing a switching operation on the railroad track imnediately
adjacent to the Leased

Premise~,

one Richard V. Richins,

conductor in charge and an employee of plaintiff, sustained
severe and permanent injuries.

Richins claims that he sus-

tained such injuries when knocked from the second locomotive
unit of a two-unit diesel engine upon which he was riding by
a spool of cable owned by Intermountain Farmers, said spool
of cable being located on the Leased Premises in a position
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) inches to the center line
of the nearest track of the plaintiff.
6.

At the time Richins sustained said injuries,

plaintiff was engaged as a common carrier in interstate
commerce; Richins was employed by plaintiff in such commerce;
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and Richins' said injuries occurred in the scope and course
of his employment for plaintiff.
7.

At the time Richins sustained his injuries, it

was dark and it had just recently stopped snowing.

There was

some snow on the ground, as evidenced by the photographs
secured on the morning following the accident and attached
hereto as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G", "H" and "I", and by
this reference made a part hereof.

In addition, attached

hereto as Exhibit "J", and by this reference made a part hereof, is a copy of a Local Climatological Data Report showing
weather conditions and precipitation levels recorded at the
Salt Lake International Airport during the month of October
1972.

The scene of the accident is approximately 18 to 20

miles from said weather reporting station in a southeasterly
direction.
8.

The train in question, consisting of two loco-

motive units, twelve loaded cars, twenty empty cars, and a
caboose, departed Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 6:00
o'clock p.m., on October 31, 1972, enroute to Provo, Utah.
9.

The train arrived at Intermountain Farmers

Association's facility at Draper, Utah, shortly before 7:00
o'clock p.m., and was stopped on the main line track adjacent
to defendant's facility headed generally in an eastbound
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compass direction.
10.

Immediately to the north of the Leased Prem-

ises were three sets of railroad tracks as shown in the print
marked Exhibit "K", and by this reference made a part hereof.
The trackage immediately north of defendant's facility is
identified as the "Poultry Track," the center track is identified as the "Main Line Track," and the track to the north
of the Leased Premises is identified as the "Passing Track."
The area north of defendant's facility and north of where the
tracks are located is fenced by the land owner on the north,
said fence running east and west.

See three photographs

taken September 26, 1975, and marked Exhibit "Q", attached
hereto, and by this reference made a part hereof.

The area

north of the fence referred to as depicted in these photographs is not owned by or leased by Intermountain Farmers.
11.

The

two

locomotive units (3645-A and 137-B)

were detached from the balance of the train remaining on the
main line trackage, pulled forward beyond the switch into
the poultry track, and subsequently backed in a westerly
direction along the poultry track adjacent to the Intermountain
Farmers Association's facility.
12.

At the time of this backward movement along

the poultry track, the engineer, an employee of plaintiff, was

I
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operating the two locomotive units from the east locomotive

(3645-A) seated at the controls located on the south side of
the east locomotive cab.

13.

The brakeman, Levi Ki Tua'one, an employee

of plaintiff, was riding the west locomotive (137-B), on the
southwest corner thereof.

He was a student brakeman and this

was his third road trip out of the yard.

14.

The lead or west locomotive unit identified as

137-B which entered the poultry track first had two headlights
operating at the time to illuminate the track and right of way,
These headlights, located one above the other on the horizontal center line of the locomotive, approximately 12 feet 5
inches above the rail, were seven inches in diameter and prodiced a total beam candle power of 600,000 units.

The brakeman

claims there was plenty of light to see the tracks as they
were backing.

He said he had no trouble seeing where he was

going (Deposition of Tua 1 one, pages 9 and 34).

15.

The purpose of the westerly inbound movement

was to pick up two empty but separated box cars located on
the poultry track serving the defendant.

These two box cars

(UP 165227 and LN 12470) at the time of the inbound move were
1 ocate d over the bare spots in the snow depicted in Exh]..bi" t

"D' 1•
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16. During the westerly inbound move on the poultry
track, the southwest steps of Unit 137-B upon which the brakeman was riding at the time must have passed by or over the
spool of cable; however, the brakeman claims he did not observe
the spool of cable.

He says he was maintaining a lookout and

did not see any obstruction or obstacle to the movement of the
train.
17.

Plaintiff's employees claim they were perform-

ing their duties for the railroad company in the customary
and routine manner under the circumstances.

The railroad

company procedure is such that before backing a train, the
track must be free from obstruction to train movement and the
track must either be seen during the movement or known to be
clear (Richins' Deposition, page 53).
18.

During the westbound movement on the poultry

track, Conductor Richins, who had been riding the caboose from
Salt Lake City to Draper, had dismounted from the caboose and
had walked easterly between the main line track and the poultry
track to assist in the switching operation being conducted on
the poultry track (Second Deposition of Richins, pages 22 and
23).

19.

Mr. Richins stated in his deposition,
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"Q.

Did you know when you left the yard to
go south that he was a new man

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

- - a new brakeman?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

Had he been an experienced brakeman,
would you have left the caboose that
night?

"A.

I'd have left the caboose but chances
are I wouldn't have concentracted S'.l
much on the work that was at hand. I
would have -- there are other duties that
I have that I could have been doing.

"Q.

You would have allowed him -- if he had
been an experienced brakeman you would
have allowed him to do the connecting
himself?

"A.

That's right.

"Q.

You wouldn't have assisted him in doing
that necessarily unless he asked?

"A.

Unless I happened to be there. If I had
arrived there at a time when I could
assist I'd assist, but in inspecting the
train, when I walk up, instead of concentrating so much on getting up there helping him, I would have spent more time
looking the train over." (Second Deposition of Richins, pages 22 and 23.)

20.

That is why I was going to help.

After the two locomotives reached the first

car on the poultry track, identified as UP 165227, the brakeman made the connection between the two locomotives and said
car.
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21.

Conductor Richins, who by this time had arrived

at the west car on the poultry track (LN 12470), transmitted
instructions to the engineer by walkie-talkie radio which he
was carrying to facilitate the coupling between UP 165227 and

LN 12470.

The track where the switching was being conducted

was curved in such a manner that the engineer could not see to
the rear of the train and visually receive signals from the
brakeman or conductor, so the conductor was transmitting signals by radio in the customary and authorized manner under
such circumstances.
22.

After the coupling had been completed and the

brake air lines charged, Conductor Richins advised the engineer by walkie-talkie radio to commence the eastbound movement
in order to return to the main line trackage and the balance
of the train.
23.

As the movement commenced, Conductor Richins

and the brakeman simultaneously stepped aboard the southwest
corner of trailing locomotive 137-B.

Richins testified that

he would not have mounted the train as it moved out to the
main line but would have walked over to the caboose if it hadn't
been for the rubbish, slimy dust, brain dust or grain on the
ground in the area (See Richins' deposition, page 28, lines 1-5;
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page 34, lines 6-11; page 35, lines 5-13, 22-25; and page
36, lines 1-2).
24.

The brakeman claims he had both of his feet

located on the bottom step of trailing locomotive 137-B, as
depicted in the photograph marked Exhibit "L", and Conductor
Richins claims he had his right foot on the bottom step and
left foot on the foot board, as depicted in said Exhibit "L".
Richins said both men were crowding onto the same area but
that such a situation was not abnormal or unusual with a
student brakeman (Second Deposition of Richins, page 18).
25.

After the movement had obtained the speed of

approximately three to five miles per hour and had moved
approximately two box car lengths, Conductor Richins claims
he was knocked off the moving train by the spool of cable
CMiled by the defendant and depicted in Exhibits "E", "F", "G",
"H", and "I", precipitating the injuries sustained.
26.

At the time of the accident, Conductor Richins

was riding the train movement on the south side of the poultry
track next to the Intermountain Farmers Association's facility,
under lease to the defendant.

The spool of one-half inch

steel cable, as depicted in the photographs marked Exhibits "E",
"F", "G", "H", and "I", at the time of the accident was located
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within eight (8) feet six (6) inches from the center line of
the poultry track illlDEldiately adjacent to the Leaaed Premiaee.
27.

Neither plaintiff nor any of ita employees,

agents, servants, etc. claims to have been aware of or to have
observed the subject spool of cable at any time prior to the
accident.
28.

After the accident, the spool of cable owned

by defendant was observed to be located approximately one
foot south of the south rail of the poultry track in the loca•
tion shown in the photographs marked Exhibits "E", "F", "G",
"H", and "I".

The distance between the rails of the poultry

track was four (4) feet eight and one-half (8\) inches.
29.

Defendant claims to have last seen the spool

of cable located right next to its building immediately south
of the poultry track where the accident occurred.
11:00 o'clock

a.~.

At about

on the day prior to the accident, an em-

ployee of defendant, Robert

w.

Turley, its plant manager, made

an inspection of the building, by wnlking along the same.
Such inspections were made approximately once a week (Turley
deposition, pages 14, 15 and 37).
30.

Defendant's employees disclaim having any

knowledge as to how the spool of cable got to its location at
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or near the track on the night of the accident.

The night of

the accident in question was Halloween night.
31.

The dimensions of the spool were approximately

one (1) foot in height by two (2) feet four (4) inches in
length.

Attached to the spool was some one-half inch (1/2)

steel cable.

The defendant claims it never used the spool

and cable.
32.

By letter, dated December 15, 1972, plaintiff

advised defendant in writing of the subject accident, expressed the opinion that legal action was apparent, and
provided defendant full opportunity to defend or participate
in the disposition thereof.

(A copy of said letter, marked

Exhibit "M", is attached hereto.)
33.

On or about January 29, 1973, said Richard V.

Richins filed an action, alleging negligent conduct against
the Railroad, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, entitled "Richard V. Richins vs.
Union Pacific Railroad Company," identified as Civil Number
210084, demanding judgment for injuries sustained in the
above-described accident in the sum of $750,000.00; such
action was brought under and by virtue of the provisions of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 51,
et seq.
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34.

On February 21, 1973, the Railroad notified

Intermountain Farmers in writing of the pendency of such
action and again provided Intermountain Farmers full opportunity to defend the Railroad or participate in the defense
against Richins' law suit.

A copy of said notification is

attached hereto, marked Exhibit "N", and by this reference
made a part hereof.

By letter, dated March 22, 1973,

Intermountain Farmers declined to accept tender of the case.
35.

By a hand-delivered letter, dated and

delivered October 24, 1973, the Railroad advised Intermo\llltain
Farmers that, following extensive settlement negotiations
with Richard

v.

Richins' legal counsel, the Railroad had

agreed to compromise Mr. Richins' case for $162,500.00.

In

said letter, the Railroad requested that Intermountain
Farmers be prepared to tender the compromise payment of
$162,500.00 to Mr. Richins at the settlement conference
scheduled for October 31, 1973.

A copy of said letter is

attached hereto as Exhibit "O", and by this reference made
a part hereof.
36.

On October 31, 1973, the Railroad, by way of

compromise and in order to settle Mr. Richins' action and
secure a release, paid to said Richard V. Richins the sum of
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$162,500.00.

Intermountain Farmers' name was included in the

Release, but not by its request.

A copy of said Release is

attached hereto as Exhibit "P", and by this reference made a
part hereof.
37.

At all times mentioned herein, Intermountain

Farmers rejected the tender of defense of the claim and suit
brought by Mr. Richins and rejected any and all offers of
the Railroad to enter into negotiations and/or settlement of
Richins' suit.
38.

On or about November 15, 1973, the Railroad

ins:i.tuted this action to recover from the Intermountain
Farmers said $162,500.00, together with defense costs and
expenses in the sum of $1,195.00, reasonable attorneys' fees
in the sum of $1,840.00, and deposition expenses of $97.50,
for a total sum of $165,632.50.
39.

Under the provisions of the Federal Employers'

Liability Act herein referred to, a jury issue was presented
as to whether or not the Railroad was negligent and would
have been held legally liable to Richard V. Richins for the
injuries he sustained as described above, and the Railroad
could have been held legally liable by a jury or court for
such injuries sustained.
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40.

It is agreed by the parties that the settle-

ment made by the Railroad with Conductor Richins in his law
suit under the provisions of said Federal Employers' Liability
Act is deemed reasonable in all respects, including all costs
and attorneys' fees.
41.

The respective parties further stipulate that

all depositions taken in this action may be published and
used by the Court for the purpose of making its decision
herein.
From the facts set forth above, the plaintiff contended that it was entitled to indemnification by the terms
of its lease agreement with the defendant.

The lease provi-

sions applicable are as follows:
"Section 5. It is especially covenanted
and agreed that the use of the leased
premises or any part thereof for any unlawful or imnoral purposes whatsoever is
expressly prohibited; that the Lessee shall
hold harmless the Lessor and the leased
premises from any and all liens, fines,
damages, penalties, forfeitures, or judgments in any manner accruing by reason of
the use or occupation of said premises by
the Lessee; and that the Lessee shall at
all times protect the Lessor and the
leased premises from all injury, damage,
or loss by reason of the occupation of
the leased premises by the Lessee, or from
any cause whatsoever growing out of said
Lessee's use thereof." (Emphasis ours.)
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"Section 11. The Lessee shall be liable
for any and all injuries to or damage to
persons or property, of whatsoever nature
or kind, arising out of or contributed to
by any breach in whole or in part of any
covenant of this agreement." (R 99, 100)
From said stipulated facts and based upon the lease
provisions, the court entered its Conclusions of Law.

In

doing so, the court concluded as a matter of law that the
lease agreement between the parties required the defendant to
indemnify the plaintiff Railroad for any injuries sustained
by Richard V. Richins, the employee of the Railroad, as a
result of his accident on October 31, 1972, while performing
duties for the Railroad on the leased premises.

The court

further found as a matter of law as follows:
"The Court further concludes that the negligence of either party is not an issue or a
necessary element to the conclusion of this
action." (R 155)
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that
regardless of the negligence of the Railroad, Intermountain
Farmers, or both, the lease agreement provided absolute indemnification and in effect, required that defendant be an
insurer of the safety of the employees of the Railroad while
switching operations took place on defendant's leased premises.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

l

POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PIAINTIFF WAS
ENTITLED TO UNRESTRICTED INDEMNIFICATION FROM DEFENDANT
BY VIRTUE OF THE TERMS OF THE LEASE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PIAINTIFF WAS
ENTITLED TO UNRESTRICTED INDEMNIFICATION FROM DEFENDANT
BY VIRTUE OF THE TERMS OF THE LEASE.
Plaintiff's employee, Richins, the conductor of
the train in question, was injured on the leased premises
of Intermountain Farmers Association while an engine was
being used to remove two empty box cars from the premises.
The plaintiff's brakeman, working with Richins, signaled to
the engineer of the train to back into the premises of the
defendant when the area adjacent to the track was apparently
obstructed with a partially wound spool of cable (Exhibit
"A").

By stipulation of facts, the parties admitted that

although the train carried dual headlights emitting 600,000
candle power lighting the tracks, the trainee brakeman nevertheless claimed that he failed to see the spool near the
track.

He admitted there was plenty of light to see the

tracks as they were slowly backing and he had no trouble seeing
where he was going.

(R 91)

It was also admitted by the

Railroad's employees and the plaintiff herein that railroad
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regulations forbid the backing of a train unless the track
is free of obstruction to the movement of the train and the
regulations further require that the railroad employees
must either be able to see the track during the train's
movement or know for a fact that the track and surrounding
area are clear.

(R 92)

In any event, the engine and one

car passed by the spool and came to a stop with the spool
very near the edge of the tracks as is evidenced by Exhibit
"B".

At this point, the conductor, Richins, connected the

second car and then got onto the platform of the engine with
the trainee brakeman.

Both employees attempted to occupy

the same step or platform of the locomotive as the engine
started its forward movement out of the siding.

As the

train commenced moving out of the yard, a portion of the
engine apparently again passed near the spool where the leg
of the conductor, Richins, evidently, in some manner, came
:in contact with the spool, causing him to fall to the ground

resulting in severe injuries to his right leg.
As is indicated in the recitation of facts,

an

employee. of Intermountain Farmers claimed to have walked
along the tracks where the accident occurred on the day prior
to the accident and that such was done in making inspection

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the building.

While making the inspection tour, the

employee stated he saw no spool of cable in the track area
nor had heerer seen a spool of cable prior to that time.
It should further be noted that on the night in question,
it was Halloween and the area involved, including the plaintiff's train tracks, are unfenced.
The plaintiff claims that regardless of any negligence of its own employees or any negligence of the
defendant's employees, or a combination of both, the lease
agreement requires absolute indemnification.

Based upon this

assumption, the Railroad, after having been sued by Conductor
Richins for its alleged negligence, made payment to Richins
in settlement.

It thereafter sought indemnification from the

defendant herein under the terms of its lease.
It is respectfully pointed out that nowhere in the
lease agreement does it require or exact from the defendant
a duty of indemnification for the negligence of the Railroad.
(R 99, 100)

It is admitted that the Railroad settled its

obligation to Mr. Richins based upon his allegations of negligent conduct of the Railroad only.

The defendant herein was

not a party to that litigation, nor did Richins ever sue this
defendant.
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After reviewing the stipulated facts and the exhibits herein, including the depositions of the parties, the
trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that it made no
difference whether or not plaintiff or defendant were negligent, or either in combination, the lease agreement required
absolute indemnification as a matter of law.
This Court has repeatedly held that indemnification
does not apply unless it is specifically spelled out in no
certain terms.

un-

This Court has further held that the intention

of the parties to indemnify must be ascertained from the contract as a whole; doubt or \.lllcertainty should be strictly
construed against the parties who prepared the agreement.
Union Pacific Railroad vs. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah
2d

255, 508 P.2d 910.

The contract of lease in the instant

case was drawn by the Railroad.

It was in effect for many

years and was, from time to time, renewed by agreement.

(R 103)

In spite of each renewal, no change was ever made in the
alleged indemnity provisions.

This Court has repeatedly held

that where one party wishes to be indemnified for its own
negligence or its negligence in conjunction with the negligence
of others, it must specifically so state in the agreement.
The Court will not imply indemnity and will construe the
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indemnity provisions strictly against the party drawing the
agreement.

Had the Railroad wished to conform to the more

recent decisions from this Honorable Court, it could have
revised its indemnification

provisions at the renewal of

the lease by simple amendment if such were the intentions
of the parties.

This, however, was not done.

Appellant

concedes that a properly worded contract of indemnity between
the Railroad and third persons, such as the appellant herein,
could impose liability for negligent conduct even of the
Railroad; however, such a contract cannot be ambiguous and
must state with particularity the clear intent of the parties
to be so bound.

Unless the agreement is clearly stated to

show the intent of the parties, it would not be so construed.
It is well settled that a contract purporting to
indemnify one for his own negligence will be strictly construed in favor of the indemnitor.

See 41 AmJur 2d, Indemnity,

Section 15, Pages 699 and 700, wherein the author states:
"A contract of indemnity purporting or
claimed to relieve one from the consequences of his failure to exercise
ordinary care must be strictly construed.
Accordingly, it is frequently stated as
the general rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify
the indemnitee against losses resulting
from his own negligent acts, unless no
other meaning can be ascribed to it.
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"Mere, general, broad, and seemingly allinclusive language in the indemnifying
agreement has been said not to be sufficient to impose liability for the
indemnitee's own negligence •••• "
The facts of the instant case clearly show that the
trainee brakeman who had a duty to make sure the tracks were
clear for travel apparently failed to watch where he was going
as the train slowly moved into the yard or he saw but failed
to heed the spool near the tracks.

His negligent conduct

obviously would have been imputed to the railroad, making
it liable to its conductor, Richins, who was injured as a
result of the employee's improper lookout.
In reviewing the facts, one must further conclude
that the negligence of the brakeman, in not watching where
the train was moving or failing to heed what was there to be
seen, was active negligence.

This Court has, on numerous

occasions, adhered to the rule that a person is chargeable
with seeing what, in the exercise of reasonable care, he
should have seen.

The spool allegedly causing the injury

was certainly there to be seen when the track backed into
the siding.
The Utah decisions are entirely harmonious with
the rule heretofore referred to in the American Jurisprudence
citation.
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In Jankele vs. Texas Company, 54 P.2d 425, the
Utah Supreme Court expressed doubt that a contract to indemnify one for his own negligence would be enforcible since
it probably would be against public policy.

This Honorable

Court stated:
"The contract does not pretend to relieve the defendant from damages
occasioned by reason of improper and
negligent installation. No such construction can be given to the contract.
It is very doubtful that defendant
could relieve itself by contract from
its own negligence. Ordinarily such
contracts are contrary to public
policy."
The same thought was expressed in Walker Bank &
Trust Company vs. First Security Corporation, 341 P.2d 944;
there the Court stated:
"Assuming that in the absence of some
consideration of public policy militating against it, one may contract
to protect himself against liability
for loss caused by his negligence,
it is nevertheless well settled that
contracts in which a party attempts to
do so are subject to strict construction against himself; and further, that
he will be afforded no protection unless
preclusion against negligence is clearly
and unequivocally stated.•
A case analogous to the one at bar is Barrus vs.
Wilkinson vs. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 16 Utah
2d 204, 398 P.2d 207.

l

In that case, a tenant's employee
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slipped and fell in a common hallway and sued the landlord
who in turn filed a third party complaint against the
tenant for indemnity by virtue of the terms in a lease
agreement.

The indemnity agreement provided that:

" ••• the Lessee will save and hold the
Lessor harmless from all loss, damage,
liability, or expense resulting from
any injury to any person •••• caused by
or resulting from any act of the Lessee
or any officer, agent or employee of
the Lessee, or about the leased premises or said building."
This Honorable Court affirmed on appeal the dismissal granted by the trial court and said:
11

• • • where an indemnity agreement is involved, it is generally held that the
agreement will not be construed to
cover losses to the indemnitee caused
by his own negligent acts unless such
intention is expressed clearly and unequivocally. Especially is this true
where an affirmative act of negligence
is involved."

This Honorable Court then went on to state:
"The intention to indemnify the defendants from their negligent acts is not
clearly and unequivocally expressed in
the lease agreement •••• The district
court correctly dismissed the third
party complaint."
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company vs.
El Paso Natural Gas Company, supra, this Court said:
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"In support of its claim for indemnification from the defendant, Union Pacific
urges that it was its desire, and that the
defendant agreed: that as a condition to
granting the right of way it was to be protected just as though the pipeline did not
exist. The specific language upon which
·this contention is based is that the defendant would indemnify and hold the Union
Pacific harmless:
' ••• from and against any and all liability damage, claims, •••• of whatsoever nature, •••• growing out of
injury or harm to or death of persons
whomsoever, or loss or destruction of
or damage to property whatsoever, including the pipe line, when such
injury, harm, death, loss, destruction or damage, howsoever caused,
grows out of or arises from the
bursting of or leaks in the pipe line,
or in any other way whatsoever is due
to or arises because of the existence
of the pipe line or the construction,
operation, maintenance, repair,
renewal, reconstruction or use of the
pipe line or any part thereof, or to
the contents therein or therefrom.'
(Emphasis added.)"
In holding the lease language insufficient to establish a contract of indemnity, this Honorable Court said:
"A closely related proposition pertinent hereto is that the law does not look with favor
upon one exacting a covenant to relieve himself of the basic duty which the law imposes
on everyone; that of using due care for the
safety of himself and others. This would
tend to encourage carelessness and would not
be salutary either for the person seeking to
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protect himself or for those whose safety
may be hazarded by his conduct. For these
reasons such covenants are sometimes
declared invalid as being against public
policy. However, this may depend upon the
circumstances. The majority rule appears
to be that in most situations, where such
is the desire of the parties, and it is
clearly understood and expressed, such a
covenant will be upheld. But the presl..Dilption is against any such intention, and it
is not achieved by inference or implication
from general language such as was employed
here. It will be regarded as a binding
contractual obligation only when that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed
•••• If it had been the intent of the parties that the defendant should indemnify
the plaintiff even against the latter's
negligent acts, it would have been easy
enough to use that very language and to
thus make that intent clear and unmistakable,
which was not done here." (Emphasis ours.)
The lease between the parties in the instant case
has been in existence for a number of years without amendment of any of its provisions.

In spite of the plaintiff

Railroad's knowledge and participation in the El Paso case,
it nevertheless made no effort to alter or amend in any way
its lease provisions with the defendant herein.

This, in

and of itself, appears to be an obvious indication that the
parties had no intention of resorting to an indemnification
agreement as is now alleged by the plaintiff or such a rewording of the agreement would have been made.
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This Honorable Court again reached the same conclusion concerning indemnification agreements concerning

~

Rents Corp. vs. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848.
The language of indemnity in the plaintiff's lease
herein clearly does not attempt to exact an indemnity from the
defendant where the plaintiff's negligent conduct is also invalved.
Paragraph 5 of the lease specifically refers to the
paragraph as a paragraph to prohibit the unlawful use of the
premises and refers to the indemnification in the event the
premises were unlawfully used.

Paragraph 11 sets forth a

reference to the defendant's liability but nowhere in that
paragraph is the word indemnity or contribution ever mentioned.
(R 99-100)
Where the lessor or its employees are actively negligent in some way in causing an injury, the courts simply do
not require indemnification from the lessee.

See 19 ALR 3rd,

Page 1936, wherein the author states:
"Where acts of the railroad and the indemnitor concurred to produce the injury for which
indemnity is sought, both parties being negligent to some extent, the courts have generally
held that the railroad is not entitled to
indemnity."
See also Chicago & Illinois .Midland R. Co. vs. Evans Constr.
Co. (1965), 208 NE2d 573, 19 ALR 3rd

921.

The Illinois
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Court held that even under common law rules of indemnity,
the railroad could not obtain indemnity from the owner of
the spur track where the railroad and the owner of the spur
track were at most equally guilty of the same negligence.
In that case, the owner of the premises had contracted for
construction work in the area.

After the construction work

had been completed, some of the old railroad ties were left
on the premises but apparently not in an area immediately
adjacent to the track.

A tie was found near the track as

an employee of the railroad was getting off the train to perform his duties.

He fell over the tie and was injured.

The

railroad paid the employee when it was alleged that the railroad failed to provide him with a safe place to work and in
so doing, was negligent.

The railroad thereafter sought

indemnity from the owner of the premises.

The Illinois

Supreme Court stated:
"In the case before us, the plaintiff bases
its right to indemnity upon the ground that
the negligence of the defendant was active,
while its own negligence was passive. It
states that 'this case is predicated upon
the impropriety of defendant in placing or
failing to remove the tie which caused the
employee's injury.' The plaintiff and its
employees were business invitees. The
plaintiff railroad was responsible for failing to afford the employees a safe place of
employment. This it did not do, but this
is passive negligence. Defendant, Pillsbury,
the landowner, expecting plaintiff railroad's
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use of the premises, had the duty to make
the premises safe for plaintiff and its
employees. The breach of this duty is
active negligence."
The Court further stated:
"The difficulty with this position is that
there is no proof as to how the tie came
to be where it was when the accident
occurred or how long it had been there.
The evidence supports the inference drawn
by the trial court that the tie which
caused the injury was one of the discarded
ties belonging to the defendant, but it
goes no further ••••• There is no evidence
which suggests that the defendant or any
of its employees placed the tie on the
tracks, and there is no evidence which
suggests that the defendant knew it was
there. In the language of the restatement,
the evidence does not show that the dangerous condition was created by the defendant.
The breach of duty relied upon to shift the
entire cost of the injury from the plaintiff to the defendant must therefore be
the defendant's failure to discover and
remove the tie •••• a failure to see that
the premises were safe for the work that
was to be done. That exact same duty rests
upon the plaintiff." (Emphasis ours.)
The Illinois Court then went on to state:
"It is true that an inspection immediately
prior to the accident was a preventative.
But the duty to make such an inspection
rested equally upon the plaintiff and the
defendant."
The Illinois Court then quoted from the case of
Union Stockyards Company of Omaha vs. Chicago. Burlington,
_Q_uincy Railroad Company, 196 U.S. 217, 25 Supreme Court, 226,
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wherein the United States Supreme Court held that where
both parties, the railroad and the defendant, failed to
discover a hazard which both might have discovered by inspection, both are equally guilty of the same negligent
conduct and no indemnity or contribution can be had.

The

Illinois Court then concluded its decision by stating:
"In the present case, the plaintiff was
not the usual business invitee, but was
one which, in the conduct of its business operations, was subject to a nondelegable statutory duty to provide a
safe place for its employees to work.
That duty was no less stringent than
the duty of the defendant as the owner
of the premises. Since we hold that
the plaintiff was not entitled to indeumity from the defendant, it is not
necessary to consider whether the
injured employee was guilty of contributory negligence."
In the instant case, the contract between the
Railroad and Intermountain Farmers contains but one reference to indemnity in the entire lease agreement.

That

reference is in Section 5 of the lease agreement under the
heading "Use for unlawful purposes prohibited.

Indemnity."

The portion referring to indemnity then says
" ••• the Lessee shall at all times protect
the Lessor and the leased premises from
all injury, damage or loss by reason of
the occupation of the leased premises by
the Lessee, or from any cause whatsoever
growing out of said Lessee's use thereof."
(R 99)
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The accident in the instant case arose out of the
use of the premises by the Lessor's use of the premises, not
that of the Lessee.
In the Howe Rents case, supra, the wording of the
indemnification agreement was almost exactly the same as the
wording of the agreement in the instant case insofar as it
stated:
"Lessee assumes all liability for damages from accident ••• and agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless the lessor,
its officers, agents, and employees
from any and all damages and/or liabilitity to any person whomsoever arising
out of or resulting from the use, storage or transportation of said equipment
by the lessee or anyone else ••• "
(Emphasis ours)
This Honorable Court again stated the rule as
follows:
"The general language, 'the lessee shall
be liable for all damage to or loss of
the equipment regardless of caus~' does
not constitute a clear and unequivocal
expression creating an obligation for
the bailee to indemnify the bailer for
the bailer 1 s negligent acts."
The very limited reference to indemnity in the instant lease clearly indicates that the parties did not
contemplate such a broad indemnification as to require the
Intermountain Farmers to pay for any and all negligence,
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....

whether it be that of the Railroad's employees, its negligence, or a combination of both.

The Railroad undoubtedly

will claim that because its liability arises under FELA,
the lease agreement might require a different interpretation,
It is respectfully pointed out that both parties at all
times were aware of the obligations of the Railroad under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act.

Such being the case,

this Court has previously stated:
"It must be concluded that the parties when
they entered into the contract had in mind
the provisions of the FELA and the law
applicable thereto." Oregon Short Line
Company vs. Idaho Stockyard Company,
12 Utah 2d 205, 364 f.2d 826.
The fact that the Railroad is an FELA employer
should not give it special privileges in the courts in the
interpretation of its lease agreements.

The lease agree-

ment contained in the instant case and its reference to
indemnification is far less explicit

and definitive than

the provisions contained within the lease in the El Paso
case, supra.

In spite of this Court's admonition to plain-

tiff Railroad in the El Paso case that it should spell out
unmistakably and clearly what acts would be required for
indemnification, it nevertheless failed to do so in this
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instant case.

In spite of renewals of the lease, there has

been no amendment to the terms in respect to indemnity or
any interpretation thereof.

One must then conclude that

such was not an oversight by the Railroad.

It obviously

did not intend to exact such a stringent indemnification
at the time the lease was renewed.
CONCLUSION

The trial court was in error when concluding that
the lease agreement provided absolute indemnification regardless of fault.

The railroad employee, Richins, sued the

Railroad, alleging that it was negligent in failing to provide him with a safe place to work.

One can only conclude

that the negligence was the failure of the trainee brakeman
to either observe the obstruction near the track or his
failure to heed its existence.

In any event, the Railroad

was obviously actively negligent in bringing about Richins'
injury.

The Railroad firmly and freely admits that its

employees are specifically forbidden to move a train onto
the tracks of a siding or any other area until the tracks
are observed to be clear and free of obstruction.

Obviously,

neither was done by the employees of the Railroad in the
instant case which caused the injuries.
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It is respectfully submitted by Intermountain
Farmers that its lease with the Railroad is not an absolute
guaranty or a contract of insurance.

The trial court was

in error in concluding that it was.

The most that could be

said from the facts is that perhaps both the Railroad's
employees and those of Intermountain Farmers were concurrently
negligent in causing the injury.

Such being the case, the

lease agreement did not exact indemnification by virtue of
its terms.

The judgment of the trial court should be

reversed.
Respectfully submitted
F. ROBERT BAYLE
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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